

SCRIBBLINGS

Part 2: December 2020




SCRIBBLINGS IS ALWAYS INTERESTED in war correspondents. They are important in the work of the military media operator. Relationships between the two have always been mixed-often fruitful often misunderstanding on both sides. There are those who were shunned for reporting from the back-row, miles behind the lines, those who were respected and sometimes thought mad for moving ahead of the forward edge of the battle; there were those who sought glory and fame and those who simply wanted to do a good job.

In other words, a cosmopolitan breed just like those who were tasked to help and convey the military's chosen messages. The relationship between the military and media, past and present, is ever up for discussion at P&S events, so this month the editorial team looks back across the centuries of those who rejoice in the title of war correspondent.

Perhaps with a sense of Déjà vu, Editor Mike Peters, takes a particular interest in the English Civil War. His Cornish/Welsh ancestry has prompted deep interest in the times of Prince Owain Glyndwr and the fight against the English - the invaders across Offa's Dyke. But his real interest is in the English Civil War.

This was an era when newspapers were making an appearance, the age of the pamphleteer and, some might say, an age when psy-ops began to be used in a formulaic way. Crude at times and often simply rude and nasty, in that it sought to disparage and create spurious reputations and manufacture myths, it nevertheless was an instrument of war to both Royalists and Roundheads.



The New Model Army, which was the foundation, many think, of today's armed forces was adept at using "war correspondents". The religious fervour of the Protestant cause produced advocates of the Parliamentary cause who stirred not only passions but souls.

Perhaps the most notorious was Hugh Peters. A man who very successfully exhorted the iron clad Roundheads to great things on the battlefield, whose oratory swayed ordinary people and enemies to support the Cromwellian cause, and a writer of despatches that reported the battles of the Civil war in detail. He was even known to enter the fray and, at the siege of Pembroke Castle, was inspired to collect a number of heavy cannon and bustle them through the logistics chain to the walls of the fortress. Its Garrison surrendered soon after.

Hugh Peters is not just a namesake, but an ancestor of the Editor's family. Hugh was a rogue preacher who upset his bishop, an adventurer who escaped Britain's shores to find family friends to help him in Holland; an enthusiast for the New World where his

reputation stills run high among those who study the minutiae of the colony's history. He was even involved in the foundation of that seat of learning, Harvard.

It was his association with Cromwell, his dislike of Britain's royalty, and his part in the execution of Charles I that brought him to a fateful end at Charing Cross where he was hung, drawn and quartered on the Restoration of Charles 2. His part in history of our islands and in the saga of war reporting is included in this snapshot of The Civil War.

What Were the Key Developments in Propaganda During the English Civil War?

By Emma Irving, History Hit.

THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR was a fertile ground for experimenting with new forms of propaganda. Civil war presented a peculiar new challenge in that armies now had to win people to their side rather than simply summoning them. Propaganda used fear to ensure that the conflict seemed necessary.

The English Civil War was also the time when a popular press emerged to record and report on the dramatic events to an increasingly literate public, one that was hungry for news. The proliferation of the printing press during the political crisis of the 1640's combined to make the English Civil War one of the first propaganda wars in history. Between 1640 and 1660 more than 30,000 publications were printed in London alone.

Many of these were written in plain English for the first time and were sold on the streets for as little as a penny making them available to the common people – it was political and religious propaganda on a grand scale. The Parliamentarians had the immediate advantage in that they held London, the country's major printing centre.



The Royalists were initially reluctant to appeal to the common people because they felt they would not gather much support that way. Eventually a Royalist satirical paper, *Mercurius Aulicus*, was established. It was published weekly in Oxford and enjoyed some success, though never on the scale of the London papers.

The first surge in propaganda were the multiple publications upon which the good people of England choked over their breakfast, as they reported in graphic detail the atrocities supposedly committed on Protestants by Irish Catholics during the rebellion of 1641.

The image below of the 'puritans' nightmare' is a typical example of how religion would come to dominate political propaganda. It depicts a tree-headed beast whose body is half-Royalist, half-armed papist. In the background the cities of the kingdom are burning.



'The Puritan's Nightmare', a woodcut from a broadsheet (circa 1643).

Commented [Mike Pete1]:

Often slander was more effective than general ideological attacks. Marchamont Nedham would switch sides between the Royalists and the Parliamentarians multiple times, but he did pave the way for personal attacks being used as propaganda.

Following King Charles I's defeat at the Battle of Naseby in 1645, Nedham published letters that he had retrieved from a captured Royalist baggage train, which included the private

correspondence between Charles and his wife, Henrietta Maria. The letters appeared to show the King was a weak man bewitched by his Catholic queen.

Popular histories of the English Civil War of 1642-46 make frequent reference to a dog named 'Boy', which belonged to King Charles's nephew Prince Rupert.



The authors of these histories confidently state that Boy was believed by the Parliamentarians to be a 'dog-witch' in league with the devil.

Frontispiece of the Parliamentarian pamphlet 'A true relation of Prince Rupert's barbarous cruelty against the towne of Burmingham' (1643).

However, research by Professor Mark Stoye has revealed that the idea the Parliamentarians were petrified of Boy was an invention of the Royalists: an early example of wartime propaganda.

'Boy' was originally a Parliamentarian attempt to hint that Rupert possessed occult powers, but the plan backfired when Royalists took up their enemies' claims, exaggerated them and, 'used them to their own

advantage in order to portray the Parliamentarians as gullible fools', as Professor Stoye says.

The Pamphleteer's Protestant Champion: Viewing Oliver Cromwell through the media of his day

By Kevin A. Creed, Essays in History: Kevin received a B.A. degree in History, with a minor in Foreign Affairs, from the University of Virginia in 1992. His essay, extracts are shown below, is based on his undergraduate thesis for Michael Graham's seminar on apocalypticism in early modern Europe.

THE YEARS BETWEEN 1640 and 1660 witnessed in England a greater outpouring of printed material than the country had seen since the first printing press had begun operating in the 1470s. The breakdown of government and Church censorship in the early 1640s was almost total until the mid-1650s when Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector re-imposed some controls.



Not until the return of the Stuarts and their royal censors did the flow of pamphlets cease. This tumultuous period of English history therefore became a crowded arena for free expression of radical religious, social, and political ideas.

This fact, coupled with the euphoria surrounding the victories of the New Model Army, the uninhibited exchange of ideas, and the general millennial atmosphere, especially following Charles I's execution, led many Englishmen to see their nation as the emerging leader of the Protestant world.

A recurring theme among these pamphlets, sermons, and broadsides was the idea that Oliver Cromwell was the man to lead England into this new age.

Like the second coming of the Swedish soldier-king Gustavus Adolphus, Cromwell would champion the Protestant cause wherever it was in need.

As a Civil War hero, conqueror of the Irish and Scots, and later as Lord Protector, the devoutly religious Cromwell certainly had the background to fit the role. Yet in practical terms, England of the 1640s and 1650s was not the military juggernaut that many writers pictured it to be.

The nation was not capable of wiping out the Turkish menace, unseating the Pope, and defending persecuted Protestants on the Continent all in one fell swoop. The financial difficulties of the Stuarts did not disappear with the execution of Charles, and though the navy was strong, it was not logistically feasible for the army to get involved in a large Continental war.

Despite this, even Cromwell himself had some occasional delusions of religious and military grandeur. A well-known quote has him saying that, were he ten years younger, "there was not a king in Europe I would not make to tremble." In moments of religious fervour Cromwell might have seen himself and England in a millennial light, yet he was first and foremost a pragmatic politician. His genuine belief in the need to aid and protect his co-religionists took a secondary position to the day-to-day realities of English society and politics.

His alliance with the Catholic French against the Spanish and his acquiescence to the war against the Protestant Dutch provide ample evidence of his heeding realpolitik considerations over any Pan-Protestant ideology.

Why then was Cromwell cast by the pamphleteers as a Protestant champion? The answer lies in the fact that the world view of the average Englishman was limited to either what he read or what was read to him, either at informal gatherings or in church. Thus, the power of the printed word is hard to exaggerate in this time of upheaval and millennial anticipation. How and why Oliver Cromwell was cast in the role of English saviour is directly related to the outlook of his contemporaries as shaped by the literature of the era.



Following Naseby, the New Model Army ran off a string of victories. An atmosphere of invincibility and a sense of divine backing began to permeate the army and its supporters. Hugh Peters, an army chaplain and Independent minister, preached a sermon before Parliament in April 1645 (which was revised and printed in 1646) in which he spoke of seeing "Gods hand" in Parliaments victory.

He made special mention of Cromwell as a decisive player in the victory at Naseby. He also saw an expanded role for England, saying that "the Lord hath made us warlike, awaked us thoroughly out of our effeminacy and we are becom[ing] formidable to our neighbours." Going even further, he saw the Palatinate, Germany, France, Ireland, and the Netherlands all looking to England for leadership.

Along with the growing public praise for the New Model Army as it continued its dominance over the Royalist forces was the increased stature enjoyed by Cromwell following Naseby. A Parliamentary newspaper in 1646 was full of praise for the “active and gallant commander Lieutenant General Cromwell” when he visited London. It described his great willingness “to advance the Great Cause in hand for the Reformation of Religion, and the resettling of the peace and government of the kingdom.” The article goes on to describe the awe in which the other MPs viewed him as well as to state, “[Cromwell] had never brought his colours from the field but he did wind up victory within them.”

It should be recalled that Europe was still embroiled in the Thirty Years War, which the Stuarts had avoided despite the fact that James I's daughter (Charles I's sister) was married to the Elector of the Palatinate. England remained neutral due to the financial crisis at home, as well as to allow James to play the role of mediator in the conflict. For many Englishmen, the refusal to aid the Protestant cause on the Continent was an embarrassment. Hugh Peters' reference to England getting over her “effeminacy” and becoming warlike is an example of Puritan disappointment with Stuart foreign policy.

The defeat of the Royalist threat in the Second Civil War was followed by the well-known events of the Army entering London on 2 December 1648 and Colonel Prides purge of the Parliament on 5 December. The Army was now in control of the government and ready to push

through its own agenda. No solution involving the king now seemed possible and talk of his being put on trial and removed was circulating the capital.

Early in December one London news sheet openly questioned what sort of government should replace the monarchy. It read, “For (say the Saints) shall not we be happy when we ourselves make choice of a good and upright man to be king over us?” The article described an elected king as one who “esteemeth of Religion and Virtue, [more] than of all other worldly things.” Two men who were deemed to possess the necessary traits were “honourable and victorious Fairfax or Cromwell, in whom God hath miraculously manifested his presence.”

This article was important not only because its author considered Cromwell suitable material for kingship, but also because it demonstrated the view of Cromwell as a “godly man” and one whose actions God had blessed.

A sermon preached before the House of Commons on 22 December 1648 by

Hugh Peters is another example of the extreme views which had emerged. Comparing the Army leaders (of whom Cromwell was one) to Moses, HE urged that the army “must root up monarchy, not only here, but in France and other kingdoms round about.”


By doing so, he asserted that the army would lead the English people out of their “Egyptian” religious and ideological enslavement. Monarchy was seen as a demonstrated evil and the eradication of it elsewhere would be a “godly” cause. Drawing from the Book of Daniel, Peter also saw the army as “that corner stone cut out of the mountain which must dash the earth to pieces.”



.....the event that official proclamations against England were not effective enough in creating an air of paranoia, Royalist propagandists were also willing to contribute. In April 1649 Ralph Clare published a fabricated declaration by several monarchs, real and imaginary, condemning England's regicidal actions. The pamphlets stated purpose was "[a] detestation of the present proceedings of the Parliament and Army, and of their [the monarchs] intentions of coming over into England on behalf of King Charles II."

Up to this point one can see the background developing for identifying Cromwell as England's religious and martial defender. His popularity with the general population, and especially with the army, coupled with the nation's growing sense of isolation, pushed him further into the role of bulwark against the enemies of England.

.....Some of the literature of this period which applauded Cromwell or cast him in the role of religious crusader was either outright government-sponsored propaganda or, at the least, encouraged by the government. An example of this is in the 1656 translation of



Bartolomeo De La Casas book *The Tears of the Indians*. The translator, John Phillips, wrote the books dedication to "Oliver, Lord Protector of the Commonwealth," asking the Protector to avenge the Spanish slaughter of the twenty million Indians of whom De La Casas wrote. Phillips suggested that the Indians cries would cease "at the noise of Your [Cromwell] great transactions, while your arm for their revenge."

The translator saw divine virtues in Cromwell which would rightfully allow him to punish "the bloody and popish nation of the Spaniards," whose crimes were "far surpassing the popish cruelties in Ireland

Another example of Cromwellian propaganda can be seen in the government's response to the public outcry to help the persecuted Protestants in the French regions under the Duke of Savoy. News sheets from the Continent had described in depth the persecution suffered by the Protestants in that area. An account of the atrocities against Protestants in Savoy was printed in April of 1655. It described people being nailed to trees, babies being eaten, and "abuses upon women as are not

to be named, so that it was a favour to be cut into pieces." The account was accompanied by pictures "so that the eye may affect the heart

.....The most impassioned admonition to Cromwell was written by George Fox. The Protector had always been friendly to the Quakers on a personal level and they had felt he was on their side. But by 1657 it was apparent that the desired changes were not forthcoming. But Fox still believed it was Cromwell's sinfulness, not his intentions, which had ruined England's chance for greatness.

.....Ending with Fox is appropriate in more ways than one. First, he summed up the wide range of expectations concerning Cromwell and England. Secondly, and more importantly, the quote is full of irony: Fox was bitter towards Cromwell for not living up to the very image which pamphleteers like himself helped to create. The facade of Protestant Champion was a result of many factors—international events, the millennial atmosphere created by the Revolutions upheaval, and the martial skill of the New Model Army and Cromwell.

However, the key to the pamphleteer's motivation lay in the utterances and writings of Cromwell himself. His deep religious convictions and belief in Gods hand as the controlling force in his own life were transferred into his public character. Oliver Cromwell unintentionally projected the image of a millennial crusader, though he was not above exploiting this reputation for political benefit.

The explosion of pamphlets fostered and encouraged this image, but by the mid-1650s it was clear that Cromwell was unfit for the role. The fatal flaw for Cromwell was that his military and political pragmatism made him both unsuitable and unwilling to fulfil the wilder aspirations of the popular media.

Chaplain, Parliamentarian, Regicide, New England Colonist – Hugh Peter(s)

Hugh Peter (or Peters) 1598 – 1660) was an English preacher, political advisor and soldier who supported the Parliamentary cause during the English Civil War, and became highly influential. He employed a flamboyant preaching style that was considered highly effective in furthering the interests of the Puritan cause.



From a radically Protestant family of Cornwall, England, though of part Dutch origin, Peters emigrated to a Puritan colony in America, where he first rose to prominence. After spending time in Holland, he returned to England and became a close associate and propagandist for Oliver Cromwell. Peters may have been the first to propose the trial and execution of Charles I and was believed to have assisted at the beheading.

Peters unsuccessfully proposed revolutionary changes that would have disestablished the Church of England's role in landholding and strike at the heart of the legal title to property. Disagreeing with the war against Protestant Holland and increasingly excluded after Cromwell's death, Peters' former outspokenness meant he faced reprisal following the Restoration and he was put to death as a regicide.

Peters was born to a father from Antwerp and was of an affluent background. Peters was baptized on 29 June 1598 in Fowey and was educated at Trinity

College, Cambridge. Having experienced conversion, he preached in Essex; returning to London, he took Anglican orders and was appointed lecturer at St Sepulchre's. He entertained, however, Puritan opinions and eventually left England for Holland

Here, his Puritan leanings again attracted attention, and he made a further move to New England. He was connected with John Winthrop through his wife, and had already formed several friendships with the American colonists.[a] He arrived at Boston in October 1635 and was given charge of the church at Salem. He played a significant role during the 1637 trial of Anne Hutchinson during the Antinomian Controversy, being one of the ministers wanting her banished from the colony. He took a leading part in the affairs of the colony, and interested himself in the founding of the new colony in Connecticut. He was also active in the establishment of Harvard College.

In 1641, Peters returned to England as agent of the colony, but soon became involved in the political troubles which now began. He became chaplain to the forces of the adventurers in Ireland, and served in 1642 in Lord Forbes's expedition, of which he wrote an account. On his return he took a violent part in the campaign against William Laud, and defended the doctrines of the Independents in a preface to a tract by Richard Mather entitled "Church Government and Church Covenant discussed ..." (1643).

In September 1643 the Parliamentary Committee of Safety employed Peter on a mission to Holland, there to borrow money on behalf of Parliament, and to explain the justice of its cause to the Dutch. He was more valuable to the Parliamentary cause as a preacher than as a diplomat, and his sermons were very effective in winning recruits to the parliamentary army. He also became famous as an exhorter at the executions of state criminals, attended Richard Challoner on the scaffold, and improved the opportunity when Sir John Hotham was beheaded.

But it was as an army chaplain that he exerted the widest influence. In May 1644 he accompanied the Earl of Warwick in his naval expedition for the relief of Lyme, preached a thanksgiving sermon in the church there after its accomplishment, and was commissioned by Warwick to represent the state of the west and the needs of the forces there to the attention of Parliament.

This was the prelude to greater services of the same nature rendered to Sir Thomas Fairfax and the New Model Army. As chaplain, Peters took a prominent part in the campaigns of that army during 1645 and 1646. Whenever a town was to be assaulted, it was his business to preach a preparatory sermon to the storming parties, and at Bridgwater, Bristol, and Dartmouth his eloquence was credited with inspiring the soldiers.

After a victory he was equally effective in persuading the populace of the justice of the parliamentary arms, and in converting neutrals into supporters. During the siege of Bristol he made converts of five thousand clubmen, and when Fairfax's army entered Cornwall, his despatches specially mentioned the usefulness of Peters in persuading his countrymen to submission.

- *In addition to his duties as a chaplain, Peters exercised the functions of a confidential agent of the general and of a war correspondent. Fairfax habitually employed him to represent to Parliament the condition of his army, the motives which determined his movements, and the details of his successes. His relations of battles and sieges were eagerly read and formed a semi-official supplement to the general's own reports. Oliver Cromwell followed the example of Fairfax, and on his behalf Peters delivered to the House of Commons narratives of the capture of Winchester and the sack of Basing House.*

It was a fitting tribute to his position and his services that he was selected to preach, on 2 April 1646, the thanksgiving sermon for the recovery of the west before the two houses of parliament

At the conclusion of the First English Civil War, Peter, though greatly disliked by the Presbyterians and the Scots, had attained great influence as leader of the Independents. In his pamphlet "Last Report of the English Wars" (1646), he urged religious toleration, an alliance with foreign Protestants, and an active propagation of the gospel. In the dispute between the

New Model Army and the Long Parliament he naturally took the side of the former, and after the seizure of the King by the Army in June 1647 had interviews with Charles I at Newmarket and Windsor, in which he favourably impressed the latter, and gave advice upon the best course to pursue.



He performed useful services in the Second Civil War, procured guns for the besiegers at the siege of Pembroke, raised troops in the Midlands, and arranged the surrender of the Duke of Hamilton at Uttoxeter. When the Army entered London in 1648 he was one of the few preachers who supported the move and spoke out in support of Pride's Purge. In August 1649 he accompanied Cromwell on his Irish Campaign, and was present at the

fall of Wexford, while later he assisted the campaign by superintending from England the despatch to Cromwell of supplies and reinforcements, and was himself destined by Cromwell for a regiment of foot. In 1650 he was appointed chaplain to the Council of State.

Through his office he exerted influence on various committees concerned with religious, legal and social reforms. The same year, during the Third Civil War he was in South Wales, endeavouring to bring over the people to the cause, and subsequently was present at the Battle of Worcester in 1651, where afterwards he preached to the victorious Parliamentary soldiers.

Role in trial and execution of Charles I

Peters rode at the head of the force bringing the Charles I to London as prisoner, and justified and supported the trial and sentence in sermons. Peters' counsel was important in the inner circle of Cromwell and influenced the highest levels of policy making. According to a witness, Peters had asserted that he was the one who first suggested to Cromwell that the king should be tried and executed. He is believed to have been the headman's assistant

In 1647 Peter called for the readmission of the Jews to England, believing this would benefit the economy and hasten the second coming. On account of his views on the admission of the Jews, Cromwell invited him to the Whitehall Conference of 1655 to support his case. At the conference Peter changed sides, expressing the opinion that not only the Jews could not be converted, but they might do harm through missionary work.

The country became unstable and factional after Cromwell's son fell from power, and General Monck came from Scotland leading the only effective and unified force left. Peters attempted to secure his position with the new power in the land and met Monck at St Albans on the

latter's march to London, but met with no favour, being expelled from his lodgings at Whitehall in January 1660. Monck's restoration of the house of Stuart placed Peters in serious danger. On 11 May his arrest was ordered. On 17 May the Library of the Archbishop of Canterbury was taken from him. He was excepted from the Act of Indemnity and apprehended on September 2 in Southwark.


Peters' preaching and addresses to Parliament on Cromwell's behalf had made him too well known as a Puritan opponent of the royal house of Stuart for any disavowals to save him, and repentance was probably his best hope. It would also prevent his property being forfeited and leave something for his heirs. However he appeared to have panicked, sending a defence of himself to the House of Lords in which he denied any share in the death of Charles I.

In addition to justifying Charles being condemned to death, Peters was thought to be one of the two heavily disguised executioners, even the one who welded the axe, though this was a task requiring some skill. The headsman's assistant had held up the severed head to

spectators, and contemptuously thrown it aside afterward, but he omitted the usual pronouncement 'This is the head of a traitor'; as a leading preacher Peters' voice would have been easily recognized.

According to witness testimony Peters had ordered a carpenter to drive staples into the scaffold (for tying Charles to the block if he resisted), been present at the scene on the day of the execution, disappeared for an hour during it, and was seen drinking water with the presumed headsman, Richard Brandon, afterwards.

He was tried on 13 October and found guilty of high treason. Peters wrote "A Dying Father's Last Legacy" to his only child, Elizabeth, in which he gave a narrative of his career. He was sentenced to be hanged, drawn and quartered, the execution took place at Charing Cross on 16 October. Many contemporaries reported him as being in despair. Peters was forced to watch John Cook suffering emasculation and disembowelment before enduring the same fate himself.



The media vs the mighty in seven quotes

By Derek J. Taylor, BBC Magazine



DONALD TRUMP'S daily and very public disagreements with the media are nothing new. In fact, those in power have been battling with the press for 500 years.

- *God hath opened the Press to preach whose voice the Pope is not able to stop with all the power of his triple crown.*
- John Foxe (1516/17–1587)

The Tudor age saw a revolution that would change for ever the relationship between those in power and those they ruled. It was a technological revolution, the invention of the printing press. Now, printed books and pamphlets could reach multitudes of ordinary citizens in far off places, put new ideas into their heads and even stir up rebellion.

It was the start of a war between the world's rulers and those with access to mass communication.

- *The liberty of the Press is the birth right of a BRITON and is justly esteemed the firmest bulwark of the liberties of this country.*
- John Wilkes (1727-1797)

By the eighteenth century, something resembling today's newspapers had begun to appear, and the first hesitant steps were being taken towards recognising the role of the press in a democratic society. If the people had any right to help choose who governed them, then they needed to be well informed.

- *Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.*
- Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826)

In the late eighteenth century, the thirteen American colonies were in rebellion against their British masters. The challenge was to keep the colonists united. It was newspapers who did that by sharing between them the latest information about their struggle, so making the rebels feel a part of something much bigger than their own local community. When the Americans gained their independence, they enshrined freedom of the press in their new constitution.

- *The first casualty, when war comes, is truth.*
- US Senator Hiram Johnson (1866-1945)

We shouldn't run away with the idea that journalists have always been on the side of truth. During the First World War, correspondents allowed themselves almost without exception to get sucked into their governments' propaganda campaigns. And it would be little different in World War Two.

- *What the proprietorship of these papers is aiming at is power, but power without responsibility, the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages.*
- Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin (1867-1947)

The history of mass communication has never been a simple tale of distributing information and opinion. It's always too been about making a profit. In the early twentieth century, vast newspaper empires were in the hands of a few businessmen. They bartered their ability to influence popular opinion through the columns of their newspapers, in return for favours from governments.

- *Television is an instrument which can paralyse this country.*
- US General William Westmoreland (1914-2005)

It's been claimed that the arrival of television, with its merciless moving images of what's really happening, left those in power with nowhere to hide. But the reality is more blurred. TV news editors can be selective in what they show, and a television reporters' words can be just as biased as those of a newspaper correspondent.

- *These are really, really dishonest people and they're bad people and I really think they don't like our country.*
- Donald Trump (1946-)

US President Donald Trump's almost daily attacks on the mainstream news media are – in one sense – just a continuation of a five-century long conflict. But technology again has changed the battlefield. Social media, Twitter, Facebook and the rest, have placed the ability to tell millions what to think directly in the hands of anyone with a smartphone - any crook, liar, foreign enemy or even the mightiest man in the world.

What hope then for the rest of us now who just want to know what's happening in the world?

10 myths about WW1 debunked

By BBC News Magazine



Getty Images

MUCH OF WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW about the 1914-18 conflict is wrong, writes historian Dan Snow, for the BBC. No war in history attracts more controversy and myth than World War One. For the soldiers who fought it was in some ways better than previous conflicts, and in some ways worse. By setting it apart as uniquely awful we are blinding ourselves to the reality of not just WW1 but war in general. We are also in danger of belittling the experience of soldiers and civilians caught up in countless other appalling conflicts throughout history and the present day.

1. It was the bloodiest war in history to that point

Fifty years before WW1 broke out, southern China was torn apart by an even bloodier conflict. Conservative estimates of the dead in the 14-year Taiping rebellion start at between 20 million and 30 million. Around 17 million soldiers and civilians were killed during WW1.

Although more Britons died in WW1 than any other conflict, the bloodiest war in our history relative to population size is the Civil War, which raged in the mid-17th Century. A far higher proportion of the population of the British Isles were killed than the less than 2% who died in WW1. By contrast, around 4% of the population of England and Wales, and considerably more than that in Scotland and Ireland, are thought to have been killed in the Civil War.

2. Most soldiers died

In the UK around six million men were mobilised, and of those just over 700,000 were killed. That's around 11.5%. In fact, as a British soldier you were more likely to die during the Crimean War (1853-56) than in WW1.

3. Men lived in the trenches for years on end

Front-line trenches could be a terribly hostile place to live. Units, often wet, cold and exposed to the enemy, would quickly lose their morale if they spent too much time in the trenches.

As a result, the British army rotated men in and out continuously. Between battles, a unit spent perhaps 10 days a month in the trench system and, of those, rarely more than three days right up on the front line. It was not unusual to be out of the line for a month.



Getty Images


During moments of crisis, such as big offensives, the British could occasionally spend up to seven days on the front line but were far more often rotated out after just a day or two.

4. The upper class got off lightly

Although the great majority of casualties in WW1 were from the working class, the social and political elite were hit disproportionately hard by WW1. Their sons provided the junior officers whose job it was to lead the way over the top and expose themselves to the greatest danger as an example to their men.

Some 12% of the British army's ordinary soldiers were killed during the war, compared with 17% of its officers. Eton alone lost more than 1,000 former pupils - 20% of those who served. UK wartime Prime Minister Herbert Asquith lost a son, while future Prime Minister Andrew Bonar Law lost two. Anthony Eden lost two brothers, another brother of his was terribly wounded, and an uncle was captured.

5. 'Lions led by donkeys'



This saying was supposed to have come from senior German commanders describing brave British soldiers led by incompetent old toffs from their chateaux. In fact, the incident was made up by historian Alan Clark.

During the war more than 200 generals were killed, wounded or captured. Most visited the front lines every day. In battle they were considerably closer to the action than generals are today. Naturally, some generals were not up to the job, but others were brilliant, such as Arthur Currie, a middle-class Canadian failed insurance broker and property developer.

Rarely in history have commanders had to adapt to a more radically different technological environment. British commanders had been trained to fight small colonial wars; now they were thrust into a massive industrial struggle unlike anything the British army had ever seen.

Despite this, within three years the British had effectively invented a method of warfare still recognisable today. By the summer of 1918, the British

army was probably at its best ever and it inflicted crushing defeats on the Germans.

6. Gallipoli was fought by Australians and New Zealanders

Far more British soldiers fought on the Gallipoli peninsula than Australians and New Zealanders put together.

The UK lost four or five times as many men in the brutal campaign as its imperial Anzac contingents. The French also lost more men than the Australians.

The Aussies and Kiwis commemorate Gallipoli ardently, and understandably so, as their casualties do represent terrible losses both as a proportion of their forces committed and of their small populations.

7. Tactics on the Western Front remained unchanged despite repeated failure


Never have tactics and technology changed so radically in four years of fighting. It was a time of extraordinary innovation. In 1914 generals on horseback galloped across battlefields as men in cloth caps charged the enemy without the necessary covering fire. Both sides were overwhelmingly armed with rifles.

Four years later, steel-helmeted combat teams dashed forward protected by a curtain of artillery shells.

They were now armed with flame throwers, portable machine-guns and grenades fired from rifles. Above, planes, which in 1914 would have appeared unimaginably sophisticated, duelled in the skies, some carrying experimental wireless radio sets, reporting real-time reconnaissance.

Huge artillery pieces fired with pinpoint accuracy - using only aerial photos and maths they could score a hit on the first shot. Tanks had gone from the drawing board to the battlefield in just two years, also changing war for ever.

8. No-one won



Swathes of Europe lay wasted, millions were dead or wounded. Survivors lived on with severe mental trauma. The UK was broke. It is odd to talk about winning.

However, in a narrow military sense, the UK and its allies convincingly won. Germany's battleships had been bottled up by the Royal Navy until their crews mutinied rather than make a suicidal attack against the British fleet.

Germany's army collapsed as a series of mighty allied blows scythed through supposedly impregnable defences.

By late September 1918, the German emperor and his military mastermind Erich Ludendorff admitted that there was no hope and Germany must beg for peace. The 11 November Armistice was essentially a German surrender.

Unlike Hitler in 1945, the German government did not insist on a hopeless, pointless struggle until the allies were in Berlin - a decision that saved countless lives but was seized upon later to claim Germany never really lost.

9. The Treaty of Versailles was extremely harsh

The Treaty of Versailles confiscated 10% of Germany's territory but left it the largest, richest nation in central Europe. It was largely unoccupied and financial reparations were linked to its ability to pay, which mostly went unenforced anyway.

The treaty was notably less harsh than treaties that ended the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War and World War Two. The German victors in the former annexed large chunks of two rich French provinces, part of France for between 200 and 300 years, and home to most of French iron ore production, as well as presenting France with a massive bill for immediate payment.

After WW2 Germany was occupied, split up, its factory machinery smashed or stolen, and millions of prisoners forced to stay with their captors and work as slave labourers. Germany lost all the territory it had gained after WW1 and another giant slice on top of that.

Versailles was not harsh but was portrayed as such by Hitler, who sought to create a tidal wave of anti-Versailles sentiment on which he could then ride into power.

10. Everyone hated it

Like any war, it all comes down to luck. You may witness unimaginable horrors that leave you mentally and physically incapacitated for life, or you might get away without a scrape. It could be the best of times, or the worst of times.

Many soldiers enjoyed WW1. If they were lucky, they would avoid a big offensive, and much of the time conditions might be better than at home.

For the British there was meat every day - a rare luxury back home - cigarettes, tea and rum, part of a daily diet of more than 4,000 calories.

Remarkably, absentee rates due to sickness, an important barometer of a unit's morale, were hardly above those of peacetime. Many young men enjoyed the guaranteed pay, the intense comradeship, the responsibility and a much greater sexual freedom than in peacetime Britain.

Making the US Marine Corps - through Public Relations

By Colin Colbourne: Conclusions of a paper submitted to The University of Southern Mississippi

THE MILITARY SERVICES of the United States are instruments of American diplomacy, but they are also reflections of American society. The case of public relations and the U.S. Marine Corps between 1898 and 1945 provides a lens through which historians can view how one of those services interacted with the American public and the successes and repercussions of this unique approach to civil-military relations.



The Marine Corps faced unparalleled obstacles in its pursuit of a secure place in the U.S. military. This peculiar position, however, placed Marines in a condition of constant defence for their own existence, thus creating a powerful drive for survival. The disadvantages the Corps had to overcome, including its small size, arguably redundant mission, and relative obscurity at the turn of the 20th century, led the Marines to take their case to the public.

In an unprecedented campaign of open dialogue with the American people, the Marine Corps overcame its limitations and emerged as heroes—a true elite fighting force in the public imagination.

While the Marine Corps as an institution did not begin the century with an explicit knowledge of the power of public relations, its ability to deploy to the locations at which

the nation needed them most, and the Corps' positive impression upon war correspondents from Cuba to China displayed the effectiveness of good publicity.

From the turn of the century, the Marine Corps built and maintained its image in the public eye. Beginning with the Spanish-American War, the Marine Corps' participation in "small wars," not only sent Marines to the corners of the earth but also gained a constant state of publicity from which the public could identify the Marines as either the protectors of Democracy or tools of American expansion to new frontiers.


In either sense, the word Marine increasingly came before the public in the first decade of the twentieth century. The public remained entranced with the actions of Marines in places like the Caribbean and the Pacific, areas of the world considered America's new frontiers.

Beginning as early as 1903, government agencies began to recognize the effectiveness of public relations precedents set in the private sector in the years before. As the use of public relations began to take hold within the federal government, the U.S. military began to employ public relations principles in order to bolster recruitment and appropriations.

The Marine Corps' development and use of a Publicity Bureau was essential in its ability to capitalize on an emerging tool for institutions to organize and control its relationship with the public.

With the foresight of Marines including Thomas G. Sterrett and others, the Recruiting and Publicity Bureau introduced its crowning achievement, *The Recruiters' Bulletin*. Through the Bulletin, Marines at the Publicity Bureau in New York could provide advice to the recruiting stations across the country.

With the experience of former newspapermen and those versed in public relations, Marine recruiters gained the ability to take the case of the Marine Corps to local newspaper editors with the Corps' ground-breaking use of press releases in daily newspapers.



The First World War brought with it the ability for the Marine Corps to allocate a more assets toward recruiting and advertising along with the national mobilization effort. While the Recruiters' Bulletin and the Publicity Bureau in New York continued to work at full capacity in order to gain publicity, the Corps' leaders, including Commandant George Barnett successfully lobbied for Marines to travel with the first troops to Europe in order to fulfil the advertising promise of being the "first the fight."

The First to Fight campaign itself proved to be an incredibly powerful publicity slogan as it not only drew in recruits, but also reinforced the Corps' image as a fighting unit. Much to the chagrin of leaders in the Army, the Marines managed to maintain a constant spotlight upon their actions through clever advertising campaigns and the constant focus on keeping the Corps' name in front of the public.

Even though Marines represented a very small percentage of the troops fighting in France, their very name allowed news of their actions to pass through the strict guidelines of wartime censorship. With the stories of Floyd Gibbons, as well as media fascination that occurred over now traditional icons,

including the term "Devil Dogs," the Marine Corps managed to emerge from the war with far more credit to their name than was proportional to their part in the entire war.

Regardless of this fact, the Corps maintained a focus on these exploits, thus creating and solidifying myth and legend within the WWI record of the Marines.

The First World War had done much for the publicity of the Marines and it was then the duty of the Corps' leadership to preserve public image momentum into the conservative 1920s and legitimize the public image the Corps developed. When Major General John Archer Lejeune succeeded Major General George Barnett as commandant in 1920, he immediately began to reorganize the Marine Corps from headquarters down. Lejeune, the Marine, was a student of the Naval Academy and the U.S. Army War College, all of which offered him strong credibility in both the military and political realms.

Having commanded an army division in the First World War, there was not much Lejeune had not accomplished, allowing him tremendous flexibility in reforming the Corps during his eight years as commandant.

Lejeune introduced sweeping reforms, including a new system of promotion and the establishment of the Marine Corps Schools, a predecessor of the Marine Corps Command and General Staff College and the Marine Corps Institute, which helped enlisted Marines develop their careers both in and out of the Corps. His reforms institutionalized professionalism in the Marine Corps and the establishment of a Marine Corps Historical centre helped to solidify the Corps' focus on the preservation and publication of its history for the future.

Lejeune continued the legacies of the Recruiters' Bulletin by maintaining a focus on the Corps' image and a drive for public relations. Even small reforms, such as the establishment of a mandatory Marine Corps Birthday celebration every year, helped to mythologize the Corps' traditions.

Conservatism and budget cuts in the 1920s forced General Lejeune to reduce both personnel and funding to the recruiting section of the Marine Corps, yet the progressive commandant volunteered Marines for various different highly publicized events. Lejeune never forgot the importance of keeping the Marine Corps in the public eye and oversaw some of the Marine Corps' most fascinating adventures.

The Corps was called out twice in the 1920s to guard the U.S. mail system from armed robbers. It is clear now that by order of the Secretary of the Navy, no information was to be released concerning the guarding of U.S. mail by Marines, yet their story "leaked" and became a national sensation. Lejeune also established a precedent for the Corps' partnership with Hollywood, a partnership that proved vitally important to the Corps' public image even through the Second World War.

If the First World War acted as the Corps' public relations renaissance, the Second World War was a canvas on which the Corps' leadership could solidify the development over the previous forty years on the Corps' public image. While Brigadier General Robert L. Denig claimed to arrive at the job as head of the Division of Public Relations with no experience, his ability to draw on the Corps' past and prepare for the Corps' participation in the war to come was uncanny. Instead of relying on the outdated methods then employed by all the services, in which protecting and reacting to the news was the norm,



- Denig sought out experts in the fields of journalism, photography, radio, and motion pictures in order to disseminate and control the Corps' news. The cadre created by Denig, called the Marine Corps Combat Correspondents, became the most significant factor in the war that helped the Corps stand out above the other services.

As the Corps' Combat Correspondents travelled all over the world to follow the Corps' achievements and the Marines on the ground, their "Joe Blow" stories filtered back to the United States to the hometowns of the families whose sons, brothers, and fathers waited desperately for news.

- *By focusing on the individual Marines' human experience in wartime, the Corps escaped the ubiquitous military and political interest stories often produced by the other services. This not only provided a service for the families and the Marines themselves, but it also helped to make the Marine's wartime experience one in the same with the American experience in general. Without the Corps'*

Joe Blow stories in the press, and its meticulous attention to getting the name of the Marines into the public, events such as the flag-raising on Iwo Jima may not have reached as wide an audience as it did.

While the Marine Corps wanted to get its name in front of the public in the Second World War, just as it did in the First World War, Marine public relations leaders still believed that there was a type of recruit that was best suited for the Corps. Through an examination of the Battle of Tarawa and the Corps' release of the film *With the Marines at Tarawa* it is clear that the Corps'

establishment of an elite image necessitated a type of recruit that fulfilled its own definitions of manliness and fitness.

With the loosening of censorship on images from the battle fronts, the Marine Corps faced a challenge in getting those recruits as parental permission for new seventeen-year-old volunteers collided head on with the disturbing news and images that came from the Battle at Tarawa.


While even the Corps' own recruiters sought to cease the displaying of these images, which showed dead and dying Marines on Pacific beaches, General Denig and the Department of Public Relations came to a different conclusion, one that had far reaching significance for the Corps' public image.

As some recruiters dealt with angry families and a reduction in volunteer numbers because of the scenes in With the Marines at Tarawa, Denig and other recruiters found that while those pictures worried the mothers and fathers of potential recruits, the type of Marine recruits that still showed up at the recruiting stations were exactly type of men the Corps sought. The type of men who saw the images of the dead and dying and wanted to join the fight, rather than run away from it.

The Marines that volunteered for the Corps in the aftermath of Tarawa, one of the Corps' bloodiest conflicts, truly embodied the image the Marine Corps had developed for nearly half a century. This was the image of a Marine around which the Corps developed its entire identity. This was the image developed from the news articles that touted its interventions around the world as the purveyors of American democracy throughout the early twentieth century.

This was the image that the slogan, "First to Fight," helped the Corps to achieve lower rejection rates during the First World War and, perhaps, led to a higher quality of combat efficiency in Europe. This was the image that Commandant John A. Lejeune helped to

legitimize and integrate into American culture during the interwar period. This was the image that the Combat Correspondents disseminated to hometowns across the country during the Second World War.



Meet the Marine Raiders: America's Amazing World War II Special Forces

By Duane Schultz , Warfare History Network

MAJOR EVANS CARLSON stood on a rickety platform built from wooden crates, the kind their rations came in. He said nothing for a moment as he looked out over the young Marines he and his executive officer had personally selected after gruelling interviews.

These were the elite, the toughest and most adventurous of the already tough and daring Marines. These were the men of the newly formed 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, America's

first special operations team, trained to strike back at the Japanese in the hit-and-run style of the British commandos.

It was 3 pm on a chilly, rainy day in the second week of February 1942. The Marines were assembled in the middle of a muddy field surrounded by eucalyptus trees, which made the

whole camp smell like menthol cough drops. This dismal place was called Jacques Farm, five miles south of Camp Elliott, a rapidly expanding part of the Marine Training Centre near San Diego, California.

In the two months since the Pearl Harbour Attack, U.S. forces in the South Pacific were being beaten back in one battle after another; Wake Island, Guam, and Bataan were no longer unknown names. Throughout the nation cries arose for America to strike back against the Japanese.

Carlson's Raiders, as the media called them, would thrill Americans with the first victory against Japanese-held territory, tiny Makin Island, some 2,000 miles west of Pearl Harbour. Evans Carlson and his men became instant national heroes on a huge scale, celebrities filling the headlines of every newspaper in the country with two Hollywood movies glamorizing their exploits.

Everyone knew about Evans Carlson and his Marine Raiders. Carlson did not look much like a hero that day at Jacques Farm. He was 46 years old and rail thin; although he stood tall and straight, he appeared frail. He had piercing blue eyes, a long nose, and a pronounced, chiselled jaw.

Historian John Wukovits described him as "an intellectual who loved combat; a high school dropout who quoted Emerson; a thin, almost fragile looking man who relished 50-mile hikes; an officer in a military organization who touted equality among officers and enlisted; a kindly individual with the capacity to kill." The first thing he did at Jacques Farm was take out his harmonica and lead his men in singing the national anthem.



When the last words of the national anthem rang out, Carlson put away his harmonica and announced that he had a lot to tell the men about their lives as Raiders. They would train and fight like no other outfit had ever done; he was not exaggerating. He talked about his years in China, where he learned from Mao Tse-tung how to fight the Japanese, and about his months with the Chinese Communist Army operating behind Japanese lines.

He said that the Raiders would work together—officers and men as one—the way the Chinese Communists did. There would be no distinction by class or rank; every man would eat the

same rations, sleep on the ground, and have the same rights and privileges. No one was better than anyone else.


Then Carlson gave them their battle cry: “Gung Ho!” The Chinese phrase meant “work together,” which was how the Raiders would learn to fight.

Six months later, Evans Carlson and his Raiders had become instant celebrities. Anyone in the States who read a newspaper, listened to the radio, or watched a Movietone newsreel knew about them. Banner headlines screamed the story of the small group of Marines, only 221, who went by submarine to attack the Japanese-held island of Makin. Now Americans had a victory to cheer and heroes to praise.

An Overnight Media Sensation

“Marines Wiped out Japanese on Makin Isle in Hot Fighting,” wrote a New York Times reporter. The press reported that the Raiders cleaned out the Japanese troops. Carlson was quoted as saying, “We wanted to take prisoners, but we couldn’t find any. Our casualties were light. We took more than ten for one. The Japs fought with typical Japanese spirit—they fought until they died. It was a sight to see. There were dead all over the place.”

Overnight Carlson and his Raiders had become a sensation. When the first submarine bringing them back from Makin reached Pearl Harbour, James Roosevelt recalled, “We were surprised to find bands playing and the piers lined with cheering people. We had not shaved or bathed or washed our clothes for two weeks, so I sent my men to clean up as best they could. It turned out to be a hero’s welcome.”



Sailors in dress uniforms, standing at attention, lined the decks of every ship the Raiders passed. Bands played the Marines’ Hymn. As the submarine eased up to the dock, a huge cheer rang out. A battalion of Marines in dress blues stood at the ready along with Admiral Raymond Spruance and his boss, Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Behind them waited a crowd of reporters and cameramen.

As Nimitz led a military delegation on board, he stepped up to Carlson, returned his snappy salute, and shook his hand to offer congratulations on a successful mission. “Makin has made you and your Raiders famous,” he said.

Sergeant Howard E. “Buck” Stidham recalled 50 years later, “The realization was slowly sinking in that we had gone from the status of a courageous and fortunate bunch of dumb-dumbs to what Kipling would probably call ‘a bloody bunch of heroes.’”

We had no concept of the hunger the American people had for some good war news and that this operation had attracted the attention of every citizen in the country.”

Carlson's Last Fight

Three months later, Carlson and his Raiders were back in action, this time on Guadalcanal. They were sent behind Japanese lines where, in what came to be called the Long Patrol, they fought in close combat for 30 days and covered over 120 miles in the steaming jungle. The Raiders killed nearly 500 of the enemy, losing 16 killed and 18 wounded. The press once again lavished praise on “Carlson's Boys,” the most famous outfit in the Marine Corps, and for a time they were the most glorified group among all of the military services.

Carlson was sent back to the States to be treated for malaria and jaundice. He did not yet know it, but he would never again be allowed to lead men in combat or to serve with his beloved Raiders.

On May 27, 1947, Carlson died of a heart attack at the age of 51. General Alexander Vandegrift, then Marine Corps Commandant, attended the funeral at Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia, but few others were present. The Marine Corps had made no public announcement of the service. When it was over, before the small group of mourners left, a Marine who had served with Carlson in China overheard General Vandegrift say, “Thank God, he's gone.”

At great personal cost, Evans Carlson had achieved what he set out to do—create an elite special operations force that helped boost the morale of the American people when it was at its lowest point. And he accomplished this on his own terms, in his own way, in defiance of the establishment and its rules.



The Greatest War Correspondent of the 20th century: Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett and The Daily Telegraph

By Dr Jenny Macleod, University of Hull

WAR CORRESPONDENTS are an extraordinary type of journalist, and one of the most outstanding amongst them worked for The Daily Telegraph. At his death, the newspaper reported: ‘With the death of Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett passes not only the greatest war correspondent of the twentieth century, but one of the most picturesque and romantic figures in the history of journalism.

‘He was a brilliant writer, he had enormous resource and unsurpassable courage, and above all, he had that knack, which is a kind of genius, of being invariably on the spot.’ Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett (1881–1931) worked for The Daily Telegraph covering the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, the French Army on the Western Front in 1916, and the revolutionary intrigues that were rife in Central Europe in 1919.

After a period as a Conservative MP, he took up his reporting duties for the paper once more, travelling to the world's trouble spots including China, Soviet Russia, Palestine and India. But it was for his work during the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 that he is best known. Uniquely amongst the war correspondents of 1914–18,

- *Ashmead-Bartlett sought to evade the constraints of censorship and alert Britain's political leaders to the failure of the campaign. He asked a visiting Australian, Keith Murdoch (who went on to found a media empire now run by his son, Rupert), to smuggle his deeply critical letter back to London, thus playing a potentially pivotal role in bringing Gallipoli to an end.*

Fearless, flamboyant, and somewhat rascally, Ashmead-Bartlett came from a well-connected family. A colleague once described him as 'a chap with an exceedingly nice nature but vilely brought up in the sort of wild selfish third-rate society that surrounded his father'. This was a reference to Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, a Conservative MP himself, who rose to become the Civil Lord of the Admiralty in Lord Salisbury's governments. Sir Ellis' scandalous affair with Blanche Hozier, mother of Clementine Churchill, caused consternation in 1889, whilst his brother married the richest heiress in England, Angela Burdett Coutts, who was 30 years his senior.

Sir Ellis died on the verge of bankruptcy, leaving his son to live with his wealthy aunt and uncle for a time. Ashmead-Bartlett's own gambling habit and lavish tastes led him to bankruptcy on three occasions and brought the end of his political career.



Ashmead-Bartlett's adventures had begun when as a 16-year-old he accompanied his father to observe the Greco-Turkish War in 1897. He served in the British Army after school for six years, fought in the South African War, and rose to the rank of captain by the time of his resignation in 1904.

Financial struggles followed, and in 1904 he turned to war correspondence for the first time, covering the Russo-Japanese war with considerable success. He had found his niche. By the time the First World War broke out he was a highly experienced journalist.

Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett as a junior officer in the Bedfordshire Regiment, c. 1900

Nevertheless, Ashmead-Bartlett remained plagued by financial difficulties. Kitchener's prohibition on war

correspondence at the beginning of the war was the final nail in the coffin for Ashmead-Bartlett's pre-existing cash flow problems.

He was declared bankrupt in December 1914, and the opportunity to return to war reporting presented a financial godsend. Matters were made all the more acute by the fact that the London newspapers represented by the Newspaper Proprietors' Association (NPA) had lost a third or more of its income from advertising since the war's outbreak.


The NPA therefore restricted the publication of Ashmead-Bartlett's reports to the London morning papers in the first instance, allowing them to be syndicated in London and overseas, but not in provincial papers. More broadly, Ashmead-Bartlett's fragile financial situation was not improved by his lavish lifestyle – by 1914 his outgoings were double his income.

Characteristically, then, whilst enjoying his adventures at the front, he ensured that life was as comfortable as possible when he was on campaign. In South Africa, he took a mixed case of champagne, port and whisky when he went to war, concealing it in his Company's ammunition cart when necessary. At Gallipoli, he was initially based on the battleship, *London*, where he enjoyed cocktails the evening before the landings on the peninsula. Later, when the war correspondents were based at Imbros, he ensured a supply of champagne for frequent parties. His colleague Henry Nevinson described his lifestyle at the front:

- *'He would issue from his elaborately furnished tent dressed in a flowing robe of yellow silk shot with crimson and call for breakfast as though the Carlton were still his corporal home. Always careful of food and drink, he liked to have everything fine and highly civilised about him, both for his own sake and for the notable guests whom he loved to entertain.'*

To sustain such a lifestyle, Ashmead-Bartlett sought to supplement his £2000 salary as a war correspondent by other means. In addition to asking for a raise during the campaign, he had photographs from the front published and promised sketches for another editor. He also took the only cinematographic film at the front, from which he received 45 per cent of any profit arising.

Ashmead-Bartlett later lectured on the campaign in Australia (lucrative plans for Britain and America having been curtailed by ill-health), where he sold his papers to the Mitchell Library in Sydney. He republished his despatches from the campaign in two books, and in 1928 wrote a third book, *The Uncensored Dardanelles*, that was highly critical of the campaign.



Gallipoli Beckons

Although the work of war correspondents was initially tightly constrained by the War Office, with the launch of the Dardanelles campaign, Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, proposed that journalists should accompany the British forces fighting there. Ashmead-Bartlett was chosen to report for the Newspaper Proprietors' Association by its chairman, Harry Lawson, who was also his boss at *The Daily Telegraph*.

Ashmead-Bartlett and his colleague Lester Lawrence (the myopic Reuters correspondent) travelled from London with the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in April 1915. All told at least 15 men filed reports from the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, but Ashmead-Bartlett's work there was the most significant and accomplished.

Ashmead-Bartlett had travelled to the front via Rome and drawing on his long-standing connections with the Ottoman Empire, there he dined with the Military Attaché and First Secretary of the Turkish Embassy. He wrote in his diary:

- *'Thinking I might be able to obtain some valuable information from these two gentlemen, I consented to break the strict etiquette of war and to meet my enemies at dinner. [...] He (the Military Attaché) told me many interesting facts about the attack of our fleet on 18 March. He said the Turks had been greatly frightened by the volume and intensity of the fire of the ships' guns, but that the actual damage was almost nil.'*

The next day he was allowed to read the official account of the operations: 'It only served to confirm my opinions that we were hopelessly underestimating our task, and that the attack on 18 March had never stood any chance of succeeding'.


This information informed one of his earliest reports from the front which 'caused the first of the many sensations which the Dardanelles were to produce in the course of the next eight months'.

In this extract, we see not only Ashmead-Bartlett's early critical stance and his delight in controversy, but also the fact that his purported diary was actually reconstructed later, after he lost his original diary along with all his belongings when the *Majestic* sank on the night of 26–27 May 1915. Of that brush with death, a survivor of the sinking later reported:

Prior to the sinking of the *Majestic*, Ashmead-Bartlett filed a series of reports observing the campaign. The despatch from Gallipoli for which Ashmead-Bartlett is most famous recounted the landings by the Anzac soldiers that formed part of the invasion of the peninsula on 25 April.

News of the landings had been announced on 26 April, but it was not until 7 May in Britain (8 May in Australia and New Zealand) that an eager public had the opportunity to read Ashmead-Bartlett's detailed account. It captured the tension of the scene as he observed the Australian soldiers approaching the coast of Gallipoli before dawn:

From the first wounded men he learned what had happened as the boats approached the shore: 'It was a trying moment, but the Australian volunteers rose as a man to the occasion. They waited neither for orders nor for the boats to reach the beach, but, springing out into the sea, they waded ashore and forming some sort of a rough line rushed straight on the flashes of the enemy's rifles. Their magazines were not even charged.'



So, they just went in with cold steel, and I believe I am right in saying that the first Ottoman Turk since the last Crusade received an Anglo-Saxon bayonet in him at 5 minutes after 5 a.m. on 25 April. It was over in a minute. The Turks in the first trench were bayoneted or ran away, and a Maxim gun was captured.'

Ashmead-Bartlett's vivid description made warfare sound like an exciting adventure. Unafraid to make bold claims on sometimes flimsy evidence (such as a precise timing for the first death), he drew occasionally outlandish historical allusions to paint a picture of a 'race of athletes' who were born warriors. Much later in the campaign, his Australian counterpart, Charles Bean, complained in his diary:

'I can't write about bayonet charges like some of the correspondents do. Ashmead-Bartlett makes it a little difficult for one by his exaggerations, and yet he's a lover of the truth. He gives the spirit of the thing, but if he were asked: 'Did a shout really go up from a thousand throats that the hill was ours?' he'd have to say

'No, it didn't'. Or if they said 'Did the New Zealanders really club their rifles and kill three men at once?' or 'Did the first battle of Anzac really end with the flash of bayonets all along the line, a charge, and the rolling back of the Turkish attack', he'd have to say: 'Well, – no, as a matter of fact that didn't occur'. Well, I can't write that it occurred if I know it didn't.'

The Constraints of Censorship

Yet, for all that he was prone to exaggeration in order to convey the romance of war, Ashmead-Bartlett could also be highly critical and would not countenance the censorship of his opinions. At first, the Royal Navy was broadly responsible for checking the journalists' work and proved surprisingly benevolent. For example, Commodore Keyes and Captain Godfrey RM allowed Ashmead-Bartlett to publish critical judgements on the failure of the naval attack of 18 March.

However, Ashmead-Bartlett increasingly came into conflict with the censorship arrangements once staff from General Sir Ian Hamilton's GHQ took over the task after the landings. He came to the view that Hamilton and his staff were 'concealing the truth from the Authorities at home'. Since he viewed himself not as 'an official eyewitness' but as 'an independent critic', Ashmead-Bartlett was set on a collision course with Hamilton.

Ashmead-Bartlett returned to London in late May after he lost his belongings on the *Majestic*. He wrote a memorandum to the British Prime Minister, Asquith, which painted a critical picture of a campaign that had come close to disaster and required very substantial reinforcements. He also shared his views in person with Asquith and a range of senior figures; a summary of his memo was presented to Cabinet. When Ashmead-Bartlett returned to Gallipoli in late June, he found his freedom of movement severely curtailed and censorship ever stricter. By September, his frustrations reached their limit.

By that point, a new offensive at Anzac in combination with new landings further up the coast at Suvla had failed, and thus all reasonable hope of victory in the campaign had evaporated. He wrote afresh to Asquith:

'Our last great effort to achieve some definite success against the Turks was the most ghastly and costly fiasco in our history since the Battle of Bannockburn. Personally, I never thought the scheme decided on by Headquarters ever had the slightest chance of succeeding and all efforts now to make out that it only just failed [...] bare no relation to the real truth.


'[...] The Staff seem to have carefully searched for the most difficult points and then threw away thousands of lives in trying to take them by frontal attacks.

'[...] The army is in fact in a deplorable condition. Its morale as a fighting force has suffered greatly and the officers and men are thoroughly dispirited. The muddles and mismanagement beat anything that has ever occurred in our Military History. The fundamental evil at the present moment is the absolute lack of confidence in all ranks in the Headquarters staff.

[...] The Commander in Chief and his Staff are openly spoken of [...] with derision.'

The letter, with its searing criticisms of a bungled campaign, was smuggled away from Gallipoli by the visiting Australian journalist, Keith Murdoch, but it was seized from him at Marseilles. Murdoch wrote his own version to the Australian

Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, which was forwarded to the British Cabinet. A copy of Ashmead-Bartlett's letter was delivered in October when he returned home following his dismissal for breaking censorship regulations.



Shortly afterwards, Hamilton was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, and after some political dithering, the campaign was abandoned. Gallipoli was evacuated in two stages in December 1915 and January 1916.

Although Hamilton blamed Murdoch and Ashmead-Bartlett for his downfall, they were not the only eyewitness critics of the campaign. Both men have been celebrated by some as whistleblowers amidst the carnage of the First World War. Yet the journalists' criticisms only had an impact because the politicians in London were already dissatisfied with the campaign.

Conclusion: A Lasting Legacy

Ashmead-Bartlett's actions mark him out as an independent-minded figure who recognised the importance of war correspondence for a nation-in-arms. His reports for *The Daily Telegraph* and other national newspapers were the most vivid source of information about the most significant campaign of the war to date.

They were doubtless avidly read across Britain and far beyond. Indeed, his reports of the campaign also played a vital role in laying the groundwork for the Anzac legend, which shaped how Australia and New Zealand viewed Gallipoli. The commemoration of the campaign has subsequently become central to both nations' sense of identity. Amidst an unusually exciting life, therefore, it is for his words and deeds in 1915 that the arrogant adventurer Ashmead-Bartlett is remembered.



War correspondents without a war!

From The Peninsular Veterans Hub, Melbourne.

IN SEPTEMBER 1955, John Grigsby, a widely-experienced journalist on *The Age* in Melbourne, was among a group of five journalists and photographers nominated by their papers to be

Accredited War Correspondents to accompany the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, to Malaya the following month. John Grigsby was to represent The Age, Sydney Morning Herald, which also provided a photographer, the Brisbane Courier Mail, Adelaide Advertiser and Hobart Mercury.

Communist Terrorists, or CTS, were infiltrating Malaya's northern states as part of a campaign to overthrow the Malayan Government. 2 Royal RAR [the first Australian battalion committed to the newly-formed Commonwealth Strategic Reserve involving Australia, Britain and New

Zealand forces], was sent to join the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade already engaging the CTS. Malaya, then, was still a British colony.



Led by the notorious Chen Ping, the CTS, mostly Malayan Chinese, attacked from across the Malaya-Thailand border and thus also were called insurgents.

Resplendent in Army officers' uniforms with a large 'C' for correspondent on their caps and shoulder flashes on their shirts and safari jackets saying 'Accredited War Correspondent' the journalists were ready for the fray.

"At short notice we were called back to Army PR and told to bring our shirts and safari jackets with us," Grigsby recalled. "Our curiosity as to the reason why was soon answered. The Federal Government had ruled that the 2nd Battalion was not going to war but rather it was going into an anti-terrorist action.

Therefore, we journalists could not be War Correspondents. "Sharp scissors were produced and the word 'War' was cut from our shoulder flashes. We were now just Accredited Correspondents."

After its arrival on the troopship Georgic, in Georgetown, on the island of Penang off the coast of northern Malaya, the battalion was quartered in the historic colonial-origin Minden Barracks. "We correspondents just did not fit in," John Grigsby said. "The essential military routines and restrictions were a constant irritation. Access to telephones, particularly for calls back to our news desks, were limited with the military having priority. And the clattering of our portable typewriters at night disturbed other officers in the adjacent thin-walled rooms."

The correspondents made the decision to move into the equally historic colonial Eastern Oriental Hotel in Penang. "It was really something out of the past," John Grigsby said. "It had big, comfortable rooms, elegant dining and bar facilities, to say nothing of daily room services and laundry, which made our life a lot easier. Access to the Cable and Wireless telegraph office and local and international telephone services meant we could file our copy at any time."

Soon afterwards a platoon of 2RAR was ordered out on a familiarisation patrol in a known terrorist area. "We correspondents, now in jungle green, accompanied them," John Grigsby recalled. "This meant we were protected by two armed soldiers and were lodged in a fortified kampong or village where we whiled away the hours. I was quite at home in jungle greens having worn them while serving with the RAAF in the Pacific in WWII.

"After a boring day hanging about the kampong, dining off army field rations and fruit bought at the kampong stalls and smoking innumerable cigarettes, we were at last called to re-join the platoon for transport back to Minden Barracks.

"After a briefing by the intelligence officer and supervised interviews with some of the troops we were at last able to file stories of at least some action by the troops. Up till then, we'd only been stories about troops settling into Minden, shopping in Georgetown, or doing tourist things on leave.

"Although the troops had not had any contact with CTS, the stories told of troops patrolling in oppressive jungle heat, sudden tropical downpours, snakes, scorpions, huge mosquitoes and tension and frustration (or relief) at not locating the enemy."

After nearly a month of waiting around fortified villages or elsewhere in the jungles, well behind patrols and with no sighting of any terrorists, the correspondents decided they would be better off waiting in Georgetown for the return of the patrols, which were now away for several days at a time.

"We were able to interview villagers who had experienced CT raids, local officials who had been harassed and rubber tappers who went out into the plantations each day with exactly enough food for one meal to reduce opportunities for CTS to get food supplies," Grigsby said.



"These and other stories provided Australian newspaper readers with a good picture of what the CT insurgency was doing to the people of Malaya."

After about five weeks the correspondent's group broke up. The news value of the patrols and CT attacks, from an Australian reader's point of view, was declining. One correspondent and a photographer went home. Another decided to stay a few more weeks while John Grigsby and Hugh Clunies Ross, a photographer with the Sydney Morning Herald, set off to work their way down the Malay Peninsula to Singapore, looking for stories of interest to Australians.

They interviewed and photographed British unit commanders about their CT operations. In Kuala Lumpur they interviewed Malaya's Chief Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, on Malaya's struggle for Merdeka [independence] and the killings, terrorism and intimidation by the CTS on the Malayan people.

In Singapore, John Grigsby and Clunies Ross spent a week with the RAAF's No 1 Squadron, which was operating Lincolns, and flew with them on bombing raids on CT hide outs and their jungle communication trails.

"This was a case of Deja vu for me," John Grigsby said. "During WWII, I was posted to No 2 Medium Bomber Squadron carrying out raids on Japanese forces, operating out of Hughes field air base near Darwin".

After nearly three months John Grigsby reported to his paper that 2RAR was now operating very close to the Thai border, was away for weeks at a time and although suffering some casualties, he

could see no point in going back to Penang. The wire services were now covering the action. He was told to come home.

John Grigsby says one of his greatest 'achievements' during his stint in Malaya was gaining supplies of Australian beer for 2RAR. His story and pictures of the troops longing for a cold Aussie beer, were widely published.

The Swan brewery responded quickly with crates of cans on a ship sailing direct to Malaya. Other breweries soon followed. The Malayan beer was not to the taste of the Australian troops and was never cold enough.

"I returned home from an area where civilians and soldiers were being killed and wounded, where British and Australian ground forces engaged in torrid fire fights with the CT and the RAF and RAAF pounded them from the air," John Grigsby said. "I am still wondering why I wasn't a 'war' correspondent."

The slow death of the Lion class - Britain's never-built battleships

By Matthew Wright

AS WAR CLOUDS war clouds loomed over Europe in the late 1930s, Britain's last generation of battleships were well in hand. By 1938 the five King George V class were under construction and the first two examples of their successors, the Lions, were due to be laid down in 1939.

The Lion was the fastest battleship developed by Britain to that time, with a main armament of new-style 16-inch guns that were superior to the Mk I 16-inch weapons fitted to the Nelson class of the 1920s. The overall design was not as large as the equivalent US ships, the Iowa class, but was the largest Britain could both build and then support in service.



The specific details of it emerged from the interaction between British industrial and infrastructure limitations and the break-down of the inter-war naval treaty system.

A protocol negotiated during 1938 increased the agreed limit on standard battleship displacement to 45,000 tons. This was a step up from the 35,000 tons of the Second London Naval Treaty.[However, the British could not build to the new limit for financial, industrial and infrastructure reasons so the 1938 Lions were not far over 40,000 tons. Despite a jump in size and fire-power, however, they were conceptually related to the preceding King George V's. Although mounting nine Mk II 16-inch guns, they had a similar protection scheme and were not radically faster This sort of relationship between successive designs was not unusual

- *Two Lion class battleships – Lion and Temeraire – were authorised under the 1938 programme for laying down in 1939. Two more – Thunderer and Conqueror – were projected for the 1939 programme, to be laid down in 1940. How they might have matched up to, for instance, Germany's contemporary 'H' class battleships is difficult to say; in general terms they were lighter, but otherwise comparable.*

In point of fact, direct comparison with ships of other nations is difficult because the staff requirements and design philosophies of the various naval powers varied, leading to differences in engineering outcome. The British, for example, re-adopted heavy vertical side armour because – among other things – it improved reserve buoyancy, offered better protection against shell splinters passing below the system in a sea-way than sloped internal armour, and was easier to repair. However, it also carried a significant weight penalty by comparison with the sloped internal side armour used by US Navy designers.

The British also had specific requirements for dimensions, draft, performance in certain water temperatures and states of hull-fouling (time out of dock), and so on, which affected the specific details of the designs. In general, though, the Lions were broadly comparable to any of the other battleships of the same generation, outside the Japanese super-battleships.

However, war intervened, and how many of this class might ultimately have been built is speculative. Up to six were projected, but of the four authorised, only three were ordered and two laid down before war brought all to a halt. Yard number 567, which was assigned to the fourth ship *Conqueror*, was used instead for *Vanguard*.

This aside, by early 1939 the Admiralty felt the new battleships they had in hand so far were insufficient to match the projected strengths of Japan, Germany and Italy. The challenge, aside from the financial constraints, was building more without the delays needed to build heavy gun mountings.

National annual capacity was seven triple 16-inch mountings. It was possible to expand that to ten, allowing a third 16-inch ship in the 1940 programme, but to do that the old facility at the Harland and Wolff Scotstoun Ordnance Works was going to have to be refurbished. However, there were other options. The idea of a new ship using four old 15-inch mountings in storage had been floated in 1937.

Now it resurfaced; and to add weight to the idea, additional 15-inch mountings were going to become available as the *Revenge* class battleships were scrapped.

As projected in 1939, a 15-inch gun ship could be laid down for the 1940-41 programme without compromising the *Lions*. There seemed potential for such a ship in the Far East, and there was talk of selling her to Australia. The DNC's department prepared plans for a 40,000 ton vessel with similar protection to *King George V*, but which was otherwise broadly a four-turret edition of the 1938 *Lion*, with much the same transom stern, secondary and anti-aircraft armament, aviation facilities, and similar superstructure.



This was unsurprising: a good deal of work had gone into optimising the *Lions* and there was no need to re-invent the wheel. By mid-July the DNC had three options to hand, one of which, 15C, repeated *Lion*'s machinery.[

Detail of the 5.25-inch DP guns fitted to HMS King George V, also intended for the Lions and Vanguard. They were also fitted to a series of anti-aircraft cruisers produced in two sub-classes.

War did not take long to disrupt things. A week after war broke out the DNC's Department was moved to Bath, a spa town well to the west of London. This was to free up office space in Whitehall for operational staff, but it took the DNC out of direct contact with the Admiralty. Design work on the 15-inch battleship was disrupted.

Then, on 3 October, the two *Lions* were suspended. So too, briefly, was work on the *King George V* class battleship *Howe*, although it was resumed, and she was launched on 9 April 1940. Work on the *Lion* and *Temeraire* also resumed, but by the time they were again halted in May 1940 only some 218 tons of steel had been assembled for *Lion* and 121 for *Temeraire*.

This was not the end of the *Lion* class; but for a while attention focused on the war. Nobody knew how it might develop, and during late 1939 the main activity was at sea.

Late that year the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, picked up the idea of using the old 15-inch mountings from a remark by the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, Rear-Admiral Tom Phillips. In early December, Churchill asked for a ship of what he called the 'battleship-cruiser type' using these weapons, 'heavily armoured and absolutely proof against air attack'.


As a result, the Admiralty continued developing the 15-inch evolution of the Lion. This ship – Vanguard – was projected under the 1940 Emergency War Programme,[and added in March that year. Further work altered the oil capacity, and new designs were approved in May. The relationship with Lion, apart from armament, was very close, and the Admiralty had not lost hope of building the Lions. That was underscored in September 1940, when the Vice Chief of Naval Staff became concerned about draught in both Lion and Vanguard, which restricted harbour access.

This led to 'Design 15E/1940' for Vanguard, with a beam of 108 feet. The side armour had to be thinned, partly to offset the weight of additional deck armour needed for increased beam. However, standard displacement rose to 41,900 tons with deep load of 47,500.

Vanguard was formally ordered in mid-March 1941, and plans were delivered to ship-builder John Brown & Co. ten days later. The Lions remained in abeyance and had lost support at political level: that week Churchill – now Prime Minister and Minister of Defence – urged that the remaining King George V's (KGVs) should be completed 'at full speed' and that Vanguard, 'the only capital ship which can reach us in 1943 and before 1945' was 'most desirable'. There was no place for the Lions, and Vanguard's new plans were approved by the Board of Admiralty in mid-April 1941.

Such decisions reflected war needs. However, the Admiralty had not lost hope and continued to develop the Lions, largely on the basis of work done on Vanguard, underscoring the relationship between the two designs. Churchill remained personally interested despite having to bow to the wider realities of Britain's industrial position, urging a Nelson style (main armament forward) layout for Lion because he imagined the midships hangar made the ship vulnerable

This reflected a misconception he had about the KGVs, which had the same hangar layout. He was wrong: as the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, pointed out, the 'aircraft hangars in the KGV class did not weaken the citadel. This had to include protection for the machinery spaces, which was enormously increased in these ships as compared with the Nelsons'. Vanguard, whose design had much the same hangar and protection scheme at the time, was implicitly included in the debate.



HMS Temeraire, second of the Lion class, as she might have appeared in 1945 with wartime-style modifications. Credit: Garlic design, via Shipbucket.

Many of the ideas applied to Vanguard were included in revised plans for Lion approved in 1942, further underscoring how the designs and thinking around them were entwined. Design work also got under way on improved 16-inch guns, coalescing eventually around the Mk IV design, which could handle higher barrel pressures and longer shells. However, official priorities focused on light aircraft carriers, some of which were ordered for construction at the Vickers Walker facility contracted for Lion.

Even if materials and labour were available, that would have delayed Lion until at least 1944. Then, in April 1943, the two ships in the class still authorised – Lion and Temeraire – were formally cancelled.

The result was that once HMS Howe, last of the King George V class, was completed on 20 August 1942, Vanguard became the sole British battleship under construction. The Admiralty still hoped to build the Lions, and design work continued on the basis of war lessons. The rising pre-eminence of aircraft intruded on occasion, including via one option for a hybrid battleship-carrier[– but all construction rested on re-authorisation.

By 1944-45 the Lions had evolved into a vastly heavier vessel on the basis of war lessons. The DNC, Charles Lillicrap, felt that even this was going to be vulnerable to air attack. Plans were then floated for a cut-down version with a six-gun main armament. However, although the Admiralty proposed evolved Lion-class battleships for the 1945 programme, they were rejected in October that year.

- So ended the Lion class – a long, slow and painful death for a concept that, if it had gone ahead as intended in 1938-39, would have produced the most powerful battleships ever built by Britain.

There was still a pro-battleship lobby in the Admiralty, and designs for 16-inch heavy gun mountings were still being contemplated as late as March 1949. Nor was the death of the Lion the last word in British battleship construction



Keep Calm and Carry On – The Compromise Behind the Slogan

By Dr Henry Irving, The History Blog

THE INSTRUCTION to 'Keep Calm and Carry On' has become one of the most recognisable slogans in British history. The phrase has reinforced a popular view of life in the Second World War and has been reproduced on everything from champagne flutes to smartphone cases. Yet its popularity also obscures a more complicated history.

This blog post marks the significant cultural artefact by exploring its place in the British government's preparations for the Second World War and drawing attention to the Treasury compromise which led to the poster's creation.

'Keep Calm and Carry On' was coined by the shadow Ministry of Information (MOI) at some point between 27 June and 6 July 1939. It was produced

as part of a series of three posters that would be issued in the event of war (the others read 'Your Courage, Your Cheerfulness, Your Resolution; Will Bring Us Victory' and 'Freedom is in Peril; Defend it with all Your Might'). The 'Keep Calm' design was never officially issued and only a very small number of originals have survived to the present day.

The MOI's planners had first considered 'Home Publicity' in August 1937 and returned to the subject in July 1938. However, their efforts were constrained by an earlier agreement that these activities would not begin until later into any future war (with the MOI to initially focus wholly on the issue of official news and censorship). It was only after the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) was asked to produce a secret report on foreign propaganda policy in March 1939 that this assumption was challenged, and thoughts turned to the necessary content of such material.


A new Home Publicity committee duly began work on 6 April 1939 with lunchtime meetings between civil servants and volunteer academics, publicists and publishers taking place on a weekly basis. The members quickly agreed that the MOI should undertake a general campaign to present 'the national cause' immediately upon the outbreak of war. They paid particular attention to proposals for a series of posters that would reassure the public by stressing the certainty of ultimate victory and emphasising that the whole community was committed to the war effort.

It was decided that the posters must 'stand out strikingly' from commercial efforts and stressed that they should be regarded as part of a coherent campaign. It was for this reason that the planners began to experiment with the use of a 'special and handsome type'. Of course, this left questions about the message. The team were instructed that this would need to attract attention, complement preconceived ideas about the conflict, be universal in appeal and balance a 'steadying influence' with an incitement to 'spontaneous' action. It was clear from the outset that this would be a difficult task, with initial proposals for a slogan reading 'England is prepared' abandoned in favour of the less politicised claim that 'We're going to see it through'.

Stalled Plans for Production and Distribution

The design process accelerated in May 1939 as funding was transferred from the secret service to the Treasury and a small 'Publicity Planning' subcommittee comprising of William Surrey Dane (the managing director of Odhams press), Gervas Huxley (the former head of

publicity for the Empire Marketing Board) and later W.G.V. Vaughan (an advertising agent who was appointed provisional Head of Production) was formed. They eventually decided that the slogan should invoke a 'state of mind' and commissioned a graphic artist to draw up a series of roughs.



The Publicity Planning subcommittee were also responsible for the later stages of production and distribution. It was quickly agreed that HM Stationery Office should be placed in charge of printing and a programme for distribution was prepared alongside a budget for preliminary printing. Surrey Dane and Huxley also proposed a contract with the advertising agency S.H. Benson Ltd so that display would extend to cover commercial as well as voluntary sites (they argued this was the only way to ensure nationwide coverage). It was anticipated that the whole campaign would cost £112,000 to deliver.

Although these figures were tentatively agreed by the MOI's planners, the Treasury were unimpressed by plans to produce seven separate designs of poster and unwilling to risk sanctioning expenditure on any design that was too

specific. The existing designs were scrapped when Surrey Dane and Huxley's programme was blocked during a specially convened meeting on 26 June 1939.

This led A.P. Waterfield, the civil servant responsible for planning the MOI, to hastily convene a meeting between members of the Home Publicity section and the controller of HMSO in a bid to find a compromise. It was reluctantly agreed that a revised application should be made for

£45,000 to cover 2.5 million copies of a single design that could be 'revised as to allow for variant forms.

A Textual Compromise

'Keep Calm and Carry On' would emerge from these and subsequent discussions. The exact point at which the slogan was coined is not recorded in the archives. However, it is clear that a revised brief was sent to Wall-Cousins, the graphic artist chosen for his versatility, on 27 June 1939, and that a selection of new designs were ready on 6 July with 'Keep Calm' amongst twenty put forward for further consideration.

It is similarly clear that the design owed much to the inter-departmental wrangling around the budget. Indeed, the experiment with a wholly textual poster was a direct response to the Treasury veto and Waterfield's proposal for a flexible design whilst the slogan was influenced by Huxley's belief in 'sober restraint' and an earlier suggestion – 'Keep Calm. Don't Panic' – made by Surrey Dane.

The stylised crown was borrowed from ill-fated plans for a 'Royal Message' that was to be sent by direct mail. And the colours were chosen in the belief that the combination of red and white produced a psychological reaction (which was in turn borrowed from Hitler's *Mein Kampf*).

It would take a further four meetings for the 20 designs to be whittled down to a shortlist of five. These were presented to the Home Secretary, Samuel Hoare, on 4 August 1939 and it was he who finally decided on 'Keep Calm', 'Your Courage' and 'Freedom is in Peril'. On 23 August 1939, exactly two weeks after the final designs had been submitted to HMSO, Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression pact with the USSR, and the decision was taken to print. Treasury approval for 3.75 million posters was granted the following day, although final contracts were only signed on Thursday 31 August, and production was still underway when war was declared on Monday 3 September.

An Uneasy Tone

It is often claimed that a decision to keep the poster 'in reserve' had been taken before the war. In fact, whilst it was agreed to wait until severe bombing began, this idea had only emerged after the aerial apocalypse failed to materialise, by which point 2.45million copies of the poster had already been passed to local distribution centres. Indeed, it had been decided that 'Keep Calm' should account for 65 per cent of the first print run on 23 August.

It was only when initial reports on civilian morale pointed to boredom rather than dislocation, that a newly appointed director of Home Publicity decided to 'go slow' and asked for funds to be transferred to produce an additional 750,000 copies of 'Your Courage' and 'Freedom is in Peril'.



This decision can be partly attributed to changes in staff and responsibility as the MOI moved out of the shadows and into the glare of public attention. However, it was also likely to have been influenced by an unease that had surrounded the slogan since its inception.

The individual responsible for sanctioning expenditure at the Treasury had, for instance, expressed real fear that 'the population might well resent having this poster crammed down their throats at every turn' whilst Waterfield maintained that the slogan was 'too commonplace

to be inspiring' and feared that 'it may even annoy people that we should seem to doubt the steadiness of their nerves'.

It is worth noting that the 'Your Courage' design was subject to just such criticism (while 'Freedom is in Peril' was decried for being too abstract).

Accused of failing to understand publicity during a hostile parliamentary debate and attacked in the press for an inept 'Waste and Paste', the MOI scrapped the entire commercial campaign after just four weeks. Stocks of 'Keep Calm' were retained until April 1940 but began to be pulped after this point as part of a cross-government effort to overcome a serious paper shortage.

Re-Discovery

The fact that a design which is now seen to symbolise an era caused so much unease amongst contemporaries remains something of an irony. Yet it was this very unease that ensured the poster would remain hidden from public view until one dusty copy was re-discovered by two booksellers in Alnwick at the turn of the twenty-first century. The rest, as they say, is history.



Would you believe it?

This priceless piece of propaganda came originally from a French newspaper called Le Moniteur, which had been founded in November 1789 during the first few months of the French Revolution, its full title being La Gazette Nationale ou Le Moniteur Universe, writes Neil Bettridge, the Harpur Crewe Archivist.

Set up to provide transcripts of debates in the French legislative assemblies, it soon became the official newspaper of the French revolutionary government. In 1804 Napoleon Bonaparte had dramatically crowned himself Emperor of France, but Le Moniteur continued to be the official mouth-piece for his governments.

It is, of course, an English translation, produced for an English newspaper, The Herald, so I do wonder whether it is actually all a spoof, so ridiculous are the contents!



The item comes from a cache of items about the Battle of Trafalgar which belonged to Lady Isabel Harpur Crewe (1852-1932). She was the grand-daughter of William Stanhope Badcock, later Lovell from 1840 (1788-1859), who had served as a midshipman on H.M.S. Neptune during the battle. He enjoyed a highly successful naval career, going on to command his own ships and achieve the rank of Vice Admiral by the time of his death. There are many of his letters to be found elsewhere in the Harpur Crewe collection.

One of his letters written to his father after Trafalgar offers what can be regarded as a more reliable account of what happened in the battle. He makes reference to his own ship, the Neptune, engaging two of the main ships of the French and Spanish fleets. First of all they tackled the Bucentaure, the ship of Admiral Villeneuve (so lauded by Le Moniteur as the victor of a pistol duel with Nelson!), and demasting it, before moving on to engage the Santissima Trinidad

(claimed to be the largest ship in the world) and doing the same to her.

These are some of the lines written by Badcock, which show that the horror of war is not confined just to the 20th century.

"I was on board our prize the Trinidad getting the prisoners out of her, she had between 3 and 400 killed and wounded, her Beams were covered with Blood, Brains, and pieces of Flesh, and the after part of her Decks with wounded, some without Legs and some without an Arm; what calamities War brings on, and what a number of Lives were put an end too on the 21st".

I have quoted these lines from part of an article, said to have been published in The English Historical Review, using a transcript of the letter, and the spellings are as they appear in the article. I hope you enjoy reading the French "report."



BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR.

Head Quarters, Cadiz, Oct. 25.

THE operations of the grand naval army second in the Atlantic those of the grand imperial army in Germany. — The English fleet is annihilated! — Nelson is no more! — Indignant at being inactive in port, whilst our brave brethren in arms were gaining laurels in Germany, Admirals Villeneuve and Gravina resolved to put to sea, and give the English battle.

Propaganda - Franco-Spanish reaction to the Battle of Trafalgar

From the Naval Chronicle, Volume: the Fourteenth, July to December 1805

FIRST BULLETIN OF THE GRAND NAVAL ARMY. [FROM THE MONITEUR.]

They were superior in number, 45 to our 33; but what is superiority of numbers to men determined to conquer? — Admiral Nelson did everything to avoid a battle; he attempted to get into the Mediterranean, but we pursued, and came up with him off Trafalgar.

The French and Spaniards vied with each other who should first get into action. Admirals Villeneuve and Gravina were both anxious to lay their Ships alongside the Victory, the English Admiral's Ship.

Fortune, so constant always to the Emperor, did not favour either of them — the Santissima Trinidad was the fortunate Ship. In vain did the English Admiral try to evade an action: the Spanish Admiral Oliva prevented his escape and lashed his Vessel to the British Admiral. The English ship was one of 136 guns; the Santissima Trinidad was but a 74. — Lord Nelson adopted a new system: afraid of combating us in the old way, in which he knows we have a superiority of skill, as was proved by our victory over Sir Robert Calder, he attempted a new mode of fighting.

For a short time, they disconcerted us; but what can long disconcert his Imperial Majesty's arms? We fought yard-arm to yard-arm, gun to gun. Three hours did we fight in this manner: the English began to be dismayed — they found it impossible to resist us ; but our brave sailors were tired of this slow means of gaining a victory ; they wished to board; the cry was, "à la bordage." Their impetuosity was irresistible.


At that moment two Ships, one French and one Spanish, boarded the Temeraire: the English fell back in astonishment and affright — we rushed to the flag-staff — struck the colours — and all were so anxious to be the bearer of the intelligence to their own Ship, that they jumped overboard; and the English Ship, by this unfortunate impetuosity of our brave sailors and their

allies, was able, by the assistance of two more Ships that came to her assistance, to make her escape in a sinking state.

Meanwhile Nelson still resisted us. It was now who should first board, and have the honour of taking him, French or Spaniard — two Admirals on each side disputed the honour — they boarded his Ship at the same moment — Villeneuve flew to the quarter-deck — with the usual generosity of the French, he carried a brace of pistols in his hands, for he knew the Admiral had lost his arm, and could not use his sword — he offered one to Nelson: they fought, and at the second fire Nelson fell; he was immediately carried below.

Oliva, Gravina, and Villeneuve, attended him with the accustomed French humanity. — Meanwhile, 15 of the English Ships of the line had struck — four more were obliged to follow their example — another blew up. — Our victory was now complete, and we prepared to take possession of our prizes; but the elements were this time unfavourable to us; a dreadful

storm came on — Gravina made his escape to his own Ship at the beginning of it — the Commander in Chief, Villeneuve, and a Spanish Admiral, were unable, and remained on board the Victory





The storm was long and dreadful; our Ships being so well manoeuvred, rode out the gale; the English being so much more damaged, were driven ashore, and many of them wrecked. At length, when the gale abated, 13 sail of the French and Spanish line got safe to Cadiz; — the other 20 have, no doubt, gone to some other port, and will soon be heard of.

We shall repair our damages as speedily as possible, go again in pursuit of the enemy, and afford them another proof of our determination to wrest from them the empire of the seas, and to comply with his Imperial Majesty's demand of Ships, Colonies, and Commerce.

Our loss was trifling, that of the English was immense. We have, however, to lament the absence of Admiral Villeneuve, whose ardour carried him beyond the strict bounds of prudence, and, by compelling him to board the English Admiral's ship, prevented him from returning to his own. After having acquired so decisive a victory, we wait with impatience the Emperor's order to sail to the enemy's shore, annihilate the rest of his navy, and thus complete the triumphant work we have so brilliantly begun.

Points to note:

- The Battle of Trafalgar was fought on the 21st October 1805 and represents the final victory of the Royal Navy over the combined French and Spanish fleets.
- The Naval Chronicle was published by J. Gold, Shoe Lane, Fleet Street, London, in a monthly format from January 1799 until December 1818 when peace had returned. Normally bound into six-monthly volumes.
- The Battle of Trafalgar took place on 21 October 1805. Cadiz was the closest major [Spanish] port which had sheltered the combined French and Spanish fleets until 19 October when they put to sea. News did not reach London until the 6th of November.
- This is an exaggerated reversal of fact. The combined French and Spanish fleets outnumbered Nelson's ships by 33 to 27.
- Another reversal of fact. The Santissima Trinidad, the Spanish Flagship, mounted 136 guns, Nelson's Victory mounted 100 guns.
- Vice Admiral Lord Nelson died of his wound from a musket ball fired by a marksman from the tops of the French ship Redoutable. The suggestion on pages 375 and 413 of this volume of the Naval Chronicle that the shot came from "the main-round-top of the Santissima Trinidad" was written before full facts were known and is inaccurate.
- Villeneuve on the Bucentaure never "met" Nelson at Trafalgar. The Victory had in fact raked the Bucentaure one time, putting her intrinsically out of action, and later Villeneuve surrendered to Captain James Atcherly of the Marines from Conqueror.

- Collingwood, who took command after Nelson's death, released Villeneuve "on parole" for humanitarian reasons during the ensuing storm and had the greatest difficulty ensuring his return.
- Of the combined fleet of 33 French and Spanish ships, the final disposition (Collingwood, 4 November 1805) was: prizes at Gibraltar, 4; destroyed (battle and ensuing storm), 16; in Cadiz, 6 wrecks and 3 serviceable; and escaped to the southward, 4.

Scratchings around

- a look back at some of the Best Stories in past publications


It was just after the Falklands War. A year in which relations between the military and the media were still fragile. Pressmen and the Ministry of Defence were still on edge about the events of 1982 when the two sides had not seen eye-to-eye about the coverage of the war in the South Atlantic. Journalists wanted openness and the military believed secrecy was the way to win battles. Something had to be done and the decision was made – take mainstream media, the regional press, trade and technical magazines and broadcasters to Germany on the major exercise of the year and see if there solutions to be found and fences to be mended. This is the tale of Exercise Eternal Triangle in British Army of the Rhine as reported in Scratchings from the Pen in 2016.

Mobilising the media...

SOON AFTER HE ARRIVED in MoD Main Building (1981) in the high flying appointment of Director of Public Relations, Brigadier David Ramsbotham, right, realised that his job and the Army's lot would be easier if journalists had a greater understanding and knowledge of the way the military worked, writes Mike Peters – then leading the Army's Press Desk in Main Building and, concurrently, the Training Major of the Territorial Army Pool of Information Officers, a strategic reserve of professional communicators in uniform.

National Service had finished years earlier and opinions among the media were not all based on the experience of uniformed service or the rigours of training for war.

That realisation turned into a plan to take not only the known defence editors and correspondents of the national press to the coal face of British Army of the Rhine but grew to encompass regional and defence press and the broadcasters.



Before the plan could take effect, the Falklands War erupted and for reasons much argued over in the months that followed there was distrust on both sides of the military and media divide.

The Ministry of Defence was also caught in a dilemma at the outbreak of hostilities...there was no Chief of Public Relations – a Civil Service two-star appointment. The consequences have been mulled over in the last three decades.

For the first few months of the conflict with Argentina not having a professional public relations leader and crisis co-ordinator to advise the Sixth Floor and the Ministry's political leaders brought worsening relations.

Nevertheless, the BAOR "media mobilisation" plan was slowly gathering momentum and there was action with three senior broadcasters being appointed to umpire the whole exercise which had the blessing of BAOR's Commander in Chief and the Corps Commander

Taking advantage of Exercise Eternal Triangle in the autumn manoeuvre season in Germany the media – critics and supporters – were offered the opportunity to take to the field and see the massive and complex world of armoured warfare and the workings of the Press Information centre.

Did the plan succeed: were the journalists impressed? As ever there were varied reactions to wearing uniform with the honorary rank of Captain given to official war correspondents.

Even the camping and hiking enthusiasts among the media did not relish the prospects of reporting this "war" exercise from a pup tent (probably of World War 2 heritage) and learning to survive in the morass of combat and lie on the cold ground in the Army's "green maggots" sleeping bags.

Moans and groans aside, plus episodes where journalists vanished overnight to the comforts of the local "gasthouses" or the delights of the "schnell imbiss" mobile stalls the overall result for the media of a taste of life in the field, the problems of filing copy or the demands on military press officers and escorts to get them to and from the action safely seemed positive.

What many did not know at the time was that BAOR public relations teams were hard at working planning for an Allied Press Information Centre to cope with media demands should the Warsaw Pact ever cross the Inner German Border.

This organisation was designed to cope with hundreds of journalists from around the world. Its size was impressive, and its vehicles and equipment scaled to cope with the rapid movement required by modern warfare.



One certainty was that DPR (Army) and the BAOR public affairs team – both Regular and Reservists – became well known and the relationship between military and media had a sound basis for future operations.

To serve in British Army of the Rhine and 1st British Corps at that time was to face the might of the Warsaw Pact. Exercises were held once the German harvest was gathered in and the

plains, farmland, mountains and forests of Lower Saxony were alive with the rumble of tracked vehicles and the screech of jets. It was a different experience to that of the journalists who reported from Afghanistan.

David Ramsbotham, today, is better known as General Lord Ramsbotham – the Pen & Sword Club's Patron. He sits on the cross benches in the House of Lords and maintains his watch on the defence of the realm and the interests of our servicemen and women and takes a special interest on matters relating to his former post military role as Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons.

A journalist's light- hearted view...and a commando raid on a German pub

By David McDine, Kent Messenger Editorial Team

IN A HUGE BARN at Holzminden in Lower Saxony a large party of journalists, dressed in British Army combat kit but looking more like banana republic guerrillas, listened attentively as the likely build-up to Armageddon was explained to them. It was October 1983 and the barn had been taken over to accommodate the Exercise Eternal Triangle Press Information Centre – just as it would have been if the Cold War had turned hot.

And when Major (now Colonel) Mike Peters, the Training Major and future Commanding Officer of the TA pool of Information Officers began his briefing on what was in store for the media men over the coming days, it was clear that what we were witnessing was something entirely new in post-war media handling.

After all the criticism of the way Falklands War information was handled, the Army was experimenting with the first uniformed 'war correspondents' since the Suez campaign. And, importantly, it was 'embedding' them.

Taking part were television crews and representatives of 50 national and major provincial groups, and, although I was a Territorial Army officer at the time, I was also a journalist and had been instructed by my editor (newspapers not being democracies) to volunteer to take part in this experiment.



From my time in Ministry of Defence public relations I knew something of the background. For years NATO military information representatives, had struggled without much success to plan for media handling in the event of Warsaw Pact hostilities. It appeared simply too difficult and the possibility of large numbers of media wandering at will hazarding operational security and causing all kinds of other problems remained a nettle no-one seemed to know how to grasp.

So, it was appropriate that at the Holzminden barn briefing we also heard from Lieutenant General Sir Martin Farndale, GOC 1st British Corps (and later a full general and GOC BAOR), who, when Director of Army Public Relations, had worked on plans for dealing with the media on operations, but unfortunately this had been overlooked when the Falklands campaign caught everyone by surprise.

It was also highly relevant that the Eternal Triangle media party was led by the then

Brigadier David Ramsbotham (now General Lord Ramsbotham) who as Director of Public Relations (Army) had had the foresight and determination to get this unprecedented media embedding experiment up and running.

In doing so he changed military and media attitudes to coverage of operations, paving the way for far better cooperation in later conflicts. I kept a (light-hearted) Eternal Triangle diary and quote from it below:

DAY ONE: We reported to the MOD and were ushered to the King Henry VIII wine cellar in the bowels of the building for accreditation. This consisted of filling in various forms which ominously required blood groups and next of kin details. The Sunday Mirror man put 'Famous Grouse' for blood group, and no-one seemed to worry.

The Army's PR director told us: 'We must assume your editors have sent you across to Germany in a very confused situation once hostilities have broken out.' Sounded like our office on Monday mornings.

A convivial evening in town with long-lost newspaper friends.

Day Two: Woke with dull pain behind the eyes and general queasiness. To Pirbright where we were ushered into the Guards Depot gym.

Our kit was laid out on tables and we shed civilian clothes and donned uniforms. Those who sent in optimistic measurements found they could not get into their trousers.

A giant from the Southern Evening (now Daily) Echo had to have an enormous extra wedge of material sewn into his to make them fit. The watching guardsmen winced.

Briefings. An RAF officer told us about protecting the integrity of our airfields. Someone whispered: 'Does he mean guarding them?'

Naval officer warned that, if we ever go to war in an HM ship, we should remember to call the captain sir and wear a tie in the wardroom.

He demonstrated a 'once only' survival suit and warned us it has a nasty habit of pushing your head down and your feet up when you hit the water.

Welsh Guards officer told us of the horrors of chemical warfare and said symptoms include dull pain behind the eyes and general queasiness. Long-lost newspaper friends of last night nodded. We knew the feeling.



We tried on nuclear, biological and chemical warfare suits. It is known as 'Noddy kit' but I felt more like a wally.

When someone shouts 'gas, gas, gas' you have nine seconds to put on your mask if it's the real thing. I took 12 seconds and the sergeant told me: 'You're dead.'

Later, in a nearby field, 50 men and one woman in noddy suits could be heard hammering in the pegs for their one-man tents in the gathering

gloom. Those who forgot to buy torches were in real trouble and one opted out.

A fitful few hour's doze in our sleeping bags was disturbed by a party of national men who made a commando raid on a local pub and came back shouting 'gas, gas, gas.'

DAY THREE: A bugler woke those who managed to doze off with reveille at 5 am. To RAF Oldham and a five-hour wait for our aircraft because of fog.

Once in Germany, bad weather ruled out a visit to inner German border and we ended up at the exercise press centre in a huge barn at Holzminden. Many briefings later three of us arrived with the 3rd Battalion of the Queen's Regiment in the middle of a wood.

In complete darkness, we fumbled our way into our sleeping bags under the trees. A mouse ran over my face and when I shone my torch to make sure it was not a rat, someone hissed: 'Put that effing light out.'

A charming major came and whispered: 'I've got to move you chaps. There's a squadron of tanks coming through here shortly and they might run over you.'

We moved, dozed, and then the tanks woke us again anyway. A patrolling sentry tripped over us to wake us yet again and then at 3 am the whole unit had to move out.

Our team got stuck in the wood behind an armoured personnel carrier that had shed a track and we had to chop down several trees to escape. There followed a long day seeing little bits of the 'war' from the back of a carrier and a Land Rover with no idea of the overall picture.

DAY FOUR: After a similarly restless night we returned to the press centre for the de-brief. Most agreed it would be impossible to do more than colour pieces if you stuck with one small unit for the real thing.

The most sensible thing would be to base yourself on the press centre and visit different parts of the 2,000square mile battlefield daily. It struck most of us that the real problem with censorship would come during any period of tension that could lead to World War III.

At that stage, with thousands of international journalists on the loose, with access to civilian communications unrestricted, reporting of warlike preparations could itself hasten war.

If nothing else, the experiment with 'war correspondents' during Eternal Triangle should help ensure that more sensible arrangements are made for limited wars like the Falklands.

Almost a decade later I came to realise the full significance of the embedding arrangements tried during Eternal Triangle. As commander of the British media section at Dhahran during the Gulf War, my role included helping set up the media teams embedded with our units and associated pooling arrangements.

From the highest level, there was a determination that I believe traced back directly to the success of Eternal Triangle to achieve a workable compromise, allowing the media the fullest possible access in return for not hazarding our operational security. Sharing the hardships and dangers with our soldiers achieved that.

Most of the media excesses and operational security problems were caused by the inevitable mavericks operating outside the pooling and embedding system.

There have of course been further conflicts since the Gulf War that I have not witnessed at first hand and about which I am not qualified to comment. Also, technology and social media have moved on so far and so fast since then that I would not presume to pontificate about the problems of operational coverage today.

But at the very least I believe we can thank the Eternal Triangle experiment for changing the entrenched attitudes of both military and media to war coverage and paving the way for more sensible working arrangements on operations.

The late David McDine, OBE was an experienced journalist and former Ministry of Defence information specialist. He is pictured here, below, on Eternal Triangle interviewing a Queensman working in Exercise Damage Control'

David's MOD appointments included Deputy Director of first Naval and later, Army Public Relations; Assistant Chief of Public Relations and Associate Secretary of the 'D' Notice Committee and Head of the Army Information Service in Northern Ireland.

Unusually David had served in all three-Armed Forces: as a National Servicemen in Royal Air Force signals intelligence in Cyprus during the EOKA campaign; as a volunteer, Royal Naval Reserve officer during the Confrontation in Malaysian Borneo.

*As the Senior TA, Public Information Officer, he deployed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait during the First Gulf War. A former director of Defence Public Affairs Consultants, David was a Deputy Lieutenant of Kent, and author of *Unconquered – The Story of Kent and Its Lieutenancy*, and of humorous and Nelson-era naval fiction.*

